My areas of expertise are political economy, development economics, and economic history.
In short, I study the mutual relations of social institutions and markets, in order to answer questions pertaining to the enhancement of growth, or to policy remedies.
More specifically, my empirical works try to causally identify the effects of the quality of social institutions on the economy. To this purpose, I aim to isolate quasi-experimental settings from historical events and political shocks.
In a first paper, published on the Journal of Development Economics, I analyse the variation in colonial regimes implemented by the British in Central India. Institutions meant to develop less discretional administration have produced better outcomes on average than those of despotic protectorates. However, the former seem to be also at the root of higher wealth inequality.
In a current working paper, I focus on the emergence of tentative vote-buying coincidentally with regional elections in Italy. To this purpose, I exploit the possibility of discretionary hirings by the incumbent administration, as well as a sudden change in the elections timing.
Each contribution can be fully consulted or downloaded below.