My fields of expertise are political economy, development economics, and economic history.
My doctoral thesis is based on three empirical quasi-experiments to understand the effects of the quality of state institutions on domestic economic development. I conclude that accountability is crucial for the state to build a credible reputation, and consequently to realise growth-enhancing interventions in the economy by means of interactions with the private sector. In contrast, unregulated discretion strengthens inefficient power imbalances.
With my first paper, published on the Journal of Development Economics, I study the variation in the type of colonial regimes defined by the British in Central India. In the long run, institutions that implemented standardised practices in public administration have produced better average development outcomes than those of protectorates where the rulers’ discretionary power faced fewer limits to discretion.
In my job market paper, I focus on the possibility of patronage coincidentally with regional elections in Italy. To this purpose, I exploit the exogenous variation in the electoral timing caused by Covid-19 in the seven regions that were initially called to vote during the spring of 2020. When discretion in the hiring decision is allowed, the probability that new public employees come from the same region as the hiring office falls right after the elections are postponed, but surges by a similar magnitude as soon as the updated election date is announced.
Contribution
Besides the specificities of each paper, my research agenda brings the following general contribution to the economic literature. It shows that checks and balances as well as transparent practices in public administration – which tend to be viewed more as values of political philosophy than on the grounds of economic relevance – have direct implications on economic outcomes. They make the public sector more predictable and credible in the eyes of private actors, thereby facilitating the cooperation of the two, which is especially important in the early development phases of a state. Furthermore, their presence they minimises the chances of political discretion to impact on the markets.